Obama Admin Ended Block On ‘Gain Of Function Research’ Days Before Trump Took Office

Obama Admin Ended Block On ‘Gain Of Function Research’ Days Before Trump Took Office

Okay, straight talk. This discovery makes the suspicions of an intentionally released Pandemic virus, with a political intent to “STOP TRUMP,” look exponentially more plausible. SARS = Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, the deadly consequence within COVID-19.

With people beginning to recognize that U.S. government officials and the intelligence community have been less than honest, and in some cases downright lying, surrounding the origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus; and when we overlay the political motives in the background of mass narrative deflection from media and other institutions; and when we consider the known lengths that people inside the U.S. government were willing to go in their efforts to eliminate President Trump; discovering that President Obama’s administration technically authorized the restart of “gain of function” research (biological weaponization of SARS virus) just days before President Trump took office… is way more than alarming.

My hunch is this link might even disappear [SEE HERE] – ER: It is copied in full below

January 9, 2017 – “lifting the current moratorium on certain life sciences research that could enhance a pathogen’s virulence and/or transmissibility to produce a potential pandemic pathogen (an enhanced PPP).” (link)

An Even Larger Backstory

Eleven days before leaving office, President Obama’s administration re-authorized funding for the creation of biological weapons using SARS viruses. However, essentially this re-authorization was only kickstarting funding within the U.S. because the funding of weaponization of SARS-CoV-2 never actually stopped in 2014. The media reporting on this is misleading, if not downright false.

In the original pdf guidance for the 2014 research pause of into weaponization of SARS viruses there was a footnote that everyone seems to have missed [LINK]:

[U.S. Government Gain-of-Function Deliberative Process and Research Funding Pause on Selected Gain-of-Function Research Involving Influenza, MERS, and SARS Viruses – pdf, page 2 – October 17, 2014]

This exception essentially permitted the Pentagon to continue funding the creation of SARS as a biological weapon in Wuhan, China, under the auspices of national security. Which is exactly what the defense department did: “Grants from the Pentagon included $6,491,025 from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) from 2017 to 2020” (link).

Timeline:

♦ October 17, 2014 – U.S. funding of SARS to create a biological weapon was paused due to the extreme risk of a pandemic.  However, the pause allowed agencies within the U.S. government to continue funding if they determined “the research is urgently necessary to protect the public health or national security.”

♦ 2014 through 2020 the Pentagon continued funding research in Wuhan, China. Fear of discovery would explain why many top officials in the U.S. Defense Department were against the Trump administration [with increased severity after the COVID pandemic began].

♦ May 2016 – [An Election Year] “after thorough deliberation and extensive input from domestic and international stakeholders, the NSABB [National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity] issued its recommendations. NSABB’s central finding was that studies that are expected to enhance PPP have potential benefits to public health but also entail significant risks. NSABB recommended that such studies warranted additional scrutiny prior to being funded.”  Anthony Fauci is on the NSABB.

♦ January 9, 2017 – [Four Days after the Susan Rice oval office meeting with Obama, Biden, Comey, et al] The Obama Administration re-authorizes funding for the creation of SARS biological weapons.  “Adoption of these recommendations will satisfy the requirements for lifting the current moratorium on certain life sciences research that could enhance a pathogen’s virulence and/or transmissibility to produce a potential pandemic pathogen (an enhanced PPP).

Given the workarounds, exceptions and plausible deniability for the consequences built into the original moratorium guidance in 2014, the defense department was operationally permitted to keep funding the biological weapons research in Wuhan, China.  The 2014 ban was a funding moratorium in name only; however, it appears the funding for U.S. research in North Carolina was stopped.

What was reauthorized in 2017 was the need to use “national security” as an excuse to continue the research.  It also appears funding of SARS as a biological weapon inside the U.S. (North Carolina) was now permitted again.

SUMMARY:

President Obama (not Trump) started the reauthorization of SARS-CoV-2 Virus experimentation in 2017.  The funding of the Wuhan Lab for the creation of SARS-CoV-2 was originated during the Obama administration and continued during the Trump administration.  The scientific community, the Obama White House and National Security Team, and the Pentagon knew the dangers of funding the weaponization of a biological weapon from SARS.

The COVID-19 pandemic was an outcome of these originating decisions.

…. and yes, there are political and ideological benefits from the perspective of Obama’s ideological group for unleashing the SARS-CoV-2 Pandemic as an opportunistic “crisis” to create totalitarian government solutions regardless of who was in office. 

However, the timing of the subsequent biological release is very suspicious in relation to the 2020 presidential election and the downstream benefits of manipulating the election via mail-in ballots.

Perhaps not a smoking gun of intent, but definitely bloody footprints walking out the door – in Obama’s size.

REFERENCES:

2017 – Policy Guidelines from Obama Administration

2014 – pdf link of Research Funding Pause

National Science Advisory Board (Wiki)

Pentagon Funding for SARS research 2013 through 2020.

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Source

LINK – https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2017/01/09/recommended-policy-guidance-potential-pandemic-pathogen-care-and-oversight

Recommended Policy Guidance for Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight

Summary:
OSTP Issues “Recommended Policy Guidance for Departmental Development of Review Mechanisms for Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO)”

Today, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is releasing “Recommended Policy Guidance for Departmental Development of Review Mechanisms for Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO).”  Adoption of these recommendations will satisfy the requirements for lifting the current moratorium on certain life sciences research that could enhance a pathogen’s virulence and/or transmissibility to produce a potential pandemic pathogen (an enhanced PPP).

Issuance of this policy guidance concludes the deliberative process launched in October 2014 by OSTP and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). At that time, OSTP and HHS asked the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), as informed by feedback from the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, to provide recommendations to help shape the development and adoption of a new United States Government policy governing the funding and conduct of this category of research. While NSABB deliberated, such projects were placed on pause.

In May 2016, after thorough deliberation and extensive input from domestic and international stakeholders, the NSABB issued its recommendations. NSABB’s central finding was that studies that are expected to enhance PPP have potential benefits to public health but also entail significant risks. NSABB recommended that such studies warranted additional scrutiny prior to being funded. NSABB further recommended a Department-level, multi-disciplinary review and ongoing Federal and institutional oversight for this category of research. The recommended policy guidance that OSTP is issuing today will implement this approach.

In particular, the recommended policy guidance implements the NSABB’s call for a pre-funding review mechanism for certain research proposals. Toward that end, the policy guidance recommends that Federal departments and agencies establish appropriate review processes if they plan to fund studies anticipated to create, transport, or use enhanced PPP. In their reviews, Departments and agencies are asked to establish that such projects satisfy eight specified principles, to assess the projects’ risks and benefits, and to develop risk mitigation plans that are commensurate with the projects’ risks. They are also requested to report the outcome of any such reviews to the OSTP Director, along with the associated risk-benefit analyses and risk mitigation plans.

Projects that have been paused under the existing moratorium will now be reviewed utilizing a process consistent with the recommended policy guidance. Any projects that are determined suitable to proceed will do so with appropriate risk mitigation measures in place.

HHS is also committing to additional actions. First, HHS will ask the NSABB to continue to provide advice on the oversight of the creation, transport, or use of enhanced PPP.  After HHS has reviewed its paused projects and made decisions about whether and how those projects will proceed, NSABB will review the process employed by HHS and provide advice, if necessary. Continued NSABB input will be essential to ensuring robust oversight of these projects.  Further, discussing the department-level review process with NSABB will promote transparency and provide valuable forums for continued public dialogue.

Second, given that studies involving enhanced PPP are often described as “dual use” research, HHS is currently conducting a review of the implementation of policies for the oversight of dual use research of concern (DURC). HHS has asked NSABB to host a series of regional stakeholder meetings to gather information about the implementation of the DURC policies, and it will also solicit feedback more broadly related to their implementation.

Policy development in this important area of research will be ongoing. OSTP and HHS will continue to examine implementation of the policies and procedures that are developed to provide oversight of enhanced PPP, and they will continue to engage the public along the way.

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