The Firewall Crumbles? Spain’s Centrists Break Taboo on Working With Conservative VOX

It remains to be seen whether this new stance will also be replicated at the European level, where the centrist European People’s Party (EPP) still keeps its distance from parties “to its right,” but the shift is clear. VOX is no longer an excluded party, and its voters, Feijóo insists, “deserve respect.”

This shift in strategy comes after the failed government talks of 2023. Although the PP won the most votes in that year’s general election, it fell well short of a majority. Feijóo explicitly rejected an alliance with VOX , leaving the PP unable to form a government. Feijóo is now aiming for a scenario where the PP governs alone, without coalition partners, but open to “parliamentary agreements” in Congress. His proposal is summed up in one dilemma: “Either [Socialist prime minister] Sánchez or me.”

In his closing speech, Feijóo made it clear that he rejects the idea of excluding any major party from political dialogue—not VOX on the right, and not the Socialists (PSOE) on the left. However, he drew a distinction between the current leadership under prime minister Sánchez—what he calls sanchismo—and a future, more moderate version of the PSOE that might be willing to rebuild national consensus.

There was only one firm line he refused to cross: any cooperation with Bildu, a left-wing Basque nationalist party with historical ties to the terrorist group ETA. “With Bildu, nothing—until they apologise to ETA’s victims,” Feijóo said.

Despite the near-unanimous support—reelected with 99.24%— and the backing of former PP prime ministers Rajoy and Aznar, Feijóo tried to avoid appearing as the old guard’s candidate. He cast himself instead as the leader of a “new era,” promoting loyal, combative figures, such as Miguel Tellado and Cayetana Álvarez de Toledo, and nodding towards his party’s harder edge—all while trying to present a centrist façade. Because it is, after all, just a façade. In practice, many of the policies remain indistinguishable from the Socialists’.

The leadership seems unwilling to tackle the significant issues that deeply divide Spanish society: mass immigration, ideological indoctrination, or territorial fracture. Feijóo promises to “reduce illegal immigration” but also rejects “hate speech,” an ambiguous stance.

Feijóo knows that many moderate Socialist voters may already be drifting toward the PP. That is why he avoids launching a frontal attack on the PSOE that could disrupt that transfer. He prefers to present himself as the reasonable, constitutional, and effective alternative to a government that, in his view, has eroded institutions and broken national consensus. In short, he does not seek to destroy his adversary but to occupy his space. This is part of normal political dynamics, but such opportunities to politically finish off an opponent are rare—and Feijóo seems intent on missing it.

A decisive phase begins: consolidating a broad majority that would allow the PP to govern alone, attracting disillusioned PSOE voters without alienating VOX supporters, and projecting a reliable image of leadership at home and abroad. The lingering question is whether this balance between tactical centrism and ideological firmness will suffice in a country where the political blocs remain deeply polarized.

Feijóo has taken one step: he has broken the cordons. The question is whether he will be able to build the bridges.